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1 Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is carried out by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in order 
to earn profits. The profitability of FDI is expected to decrease with increases in energy, 
taxes, labour costs etc.. Concerning taxation, the negative relationship between tax burden 
and FDI inflows is basically confirmed by the empirical evidence for OECD countries. (e.g. 
DeMooij and Ederveen 2003 and 2005) However, the empirical evidence concerning FDI 
and taxation in the Central- and East European Countries (CEECs) has consistently not 
found evidence that taxes matter for location decisions (see below). 
We suggest that one possible reason for this somewhat unexpected evidence for the CEECs 
in the empirical FDI-taxation literature is due to the use of a flawed indicator of tax burden. 
These flaws, we argue, can be remedied. 
The present paper differs from previous studies by including a theoretically well founded 
measure of the tax burden, namely forward-looking effective tax rates derived by Devereux 
and Griffith (1999), rather than the statutory tax rate, which has various shortcomings in 
explaining FDI. 
In this paper we examine first of all whether there is any substance in the belief that 
corporate tax rates are an important location factor for FDI from 7 home countries to 8 
CEECs.1 Secondly, we investigate whether, and to what extent, the choice of measure of the 
tax burden affects the tax elasticity of FDI. This is mainly motivated by the fact that there 
has been a gap between the conceptually ideal measure of the tax burden and its operational 
counterpart in empirical models in earlier studies. Thirdly, we compare the role of the 
corporate tax burden to that of other location determinants.  
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2
Our empirical results show that the semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to taxation ranges 
between -3.3 and -4.6. This is above those of earlier studies in absolute terms and can partly 
be attributed to using a superior measure of the corporate tax burden than the statutory tax 
rate. The results indicate that tax-lowering strategies of CEEC governments seem to have an 
important impact on foreign firms’ location decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some conceptual 
background and a review of previous studies. Section 3 describes our data set and the 
variables used. Section 4 describes the empirical specification and methodology used in the 
estimation. Section 5 presents the estimation results and discusses their significance in 
relation to earlier studies. Section 6 provides a summary of our main findings. 
 
2. Some Conceptual Considerations and a Review of Previous Studies 
The question why a particular country succeeds in competing for inward FDI can be 
answered by reference to the eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1988; Markusen 1995). Based on 
various theories (e.g. Trade Theory, Theory of the Firm and Theory of Industrial 
Organisation) the eclectic paradigm avers that FDI emerges if a firm has an Ownership-
advantage (e.g. a patent) combined with a Location–advantage (e.g. low production costs; 
large market size) and an Internalisation-advantage (e.g. economies of interdependent 
activities).  
The particular location factors considered by the firm in choosing between different foreign 
markets have to be valid proxies for host-country Location-advantages. The eclectic 
paradigm incorporates all possible location factors which attract FDI conditional on a firm’s 
decision to undertake FDI. This poses a problem as it neither attributes weights to single 
location factors like taxation, nor does it assess their relative weights. Hence empirical 
applications based upon the eclectic paradigm have to rely on more or less ad hoc
1 The home countries are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The host countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
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specifications. Recently, gravity-models have been successful in explaining bilateral trade-
flows and, more recently, bilateral FDI-flows as well (e.g. Frenkel et al. 2004, Brainard 
1997). As these models can easily be combined with the eclectic paradigm, empirical models 
explaining bilateral FDI-flows should be based on a Panel-gravity setting. It is then possible 
to classify Location-advantages in terms of factors which are efficiency- or market-related, 
supply and demand based (e.g. Mold 2003) or transition specific (Carstensen and Toubal 
2004). Our variable of main interest, the corporate income tax burden, clearly falls into the 
efficiency and supply related categories.  
As the tax burden is a factor which reduces profitability in the host-country, it should be 
negatively related to the inflow of FDI. In general, few studies have dealt with taxes as 
drivers of FDI to the CEECs. Recently, anonymous (2006) surveyed eight papers, which 
dealt explicitly with FDI to the CEECs, in order to ascertain their tax-rate elasticities. The 
outcome suggests a median tax-rate elasticity of around -1.45 (semi-elasticity). This result 
implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate will reduce FDI inflows by 1.45 
percent. As almost all of the studies surveyed used statutory tax rates as a measure of the 
corporate tax burden, the result is in line with the tax-rate elasticities found by DeMooij and 
Ederveen (2003 and 2005), i.e. -1.2 and -2.05, respectively.  
However, we question this low tax-rate elasticity. The statutory tax rate is not an appropriate 
indicator of the tax burden, especially in the case of FDI, because it does not include all 
relevant tax codes. From a conceptual and empirical point of view, bilateral forward-looking 
effective average tax rates (beatrs) should be used (Devereux and Griffith 1999 and 2002). 
Hence the estimated tax-rate elasticities from statutory tax-rates are probably flawed and 
suffer from some measurement error bias. In our study, we follow Devereux and Griffith 
(1999) and use beatrs. We expect a higher tax-rate elasticity than the one based on statutory 
tax rates as the meta-analyses by DeMooij and Ederveen (2003 and 2005) show tax-rate 
elasticities of -9.3 and -5.9 respectively, when effective average tax-rates are used.. 
In addition, the low semi-elasticities derived by anonymous (2006) may also be explained by 
the following facts, which are partly transition-specific. First, since relatively little FDI is 
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efficiency-oriented but most is horizontal FDI,, other location factors are believed to be 
important, too. In the case of the CEECs, location factors specific to the transition process 
such as hyper-inflation, privatisation, recession, exchange-rate fluctuations etc. may play an 
important role. Second, the more varied the mix of location factors in competing host 
countries, the smaller should be the influence of a single factor such as taxation. It follows 
that the tax burden should be more important the more similar potential host countries are 
with respect to other location factors, ceteris paribus. Third, MNEs may avoid taxes via 
profit shifting. Fourth, insofar as FDI-flows contribute to expansionary investment in the 
existing capital stock, it may react less than in the case of new investment and Greenfield 
investment in particular. 
 
3. Data and Variables  
Dependent Variable 
The bilateral net-FDI-outflow in millions of euro from home country (i) to host country (j) 
for the years 1995 to 2003 (t), is used as the dependent variable (fdi). Data are mainly taken 
from the ‘OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook’ and the ‘OECD 
Foreign Direct Investment’ database. Missing values are substituted by information from 
Eurostat’s ‘New Cronos’ database and from National Statistical Offices. 
The fact that we use net-FDI-outflows in our study requires some explanation, as criticism 
has frequently been directed at this measure. In particular, some authors argue that FDI-
flows reflect financial flows only and not necessarily real-capital formation in the host 
country (see Devereux and Griffith 2002, p. 84f.). These authors conclude that there is a 
superior measure, namely plant, property and equipment (PPE), which reflects real capital 
(fixed assets).  
In our view net-FDI-outflows indeed represent the annual decisions of MNEs, either to 
invest Greenfield or to acquire a foreign firm directly or to expand an existing affiliate or to 
divest in the CEECs. Net-FDI-outflows include (i) equity of the parent company in the 
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subsidiary, (ii) net-loans between parent and affiliate, as well as (iii) reinvested earnings. In 
addition, local financing in the form of raising new capital, or taking loans, contributes to the 
affiliate’s capital (vi). Empirically, using FDI-flows as the dependent variable may thus 
overestimate or underestimate “real investment”. Overestimation may result from the fact 
that financial flows, which are unrelated to the activities of the affiliate, may enter the 
components (i), (ii) or (iii). For example, transfer pricing (i.e. overvaluing services or goods 
by the parent) could have this effect as it inflates debt or overvalues services or goods by the 
affiliate, which in turn, inflates reinvested earnings. Another source of overestimation is the 
capital provided by the parent company to cover losses of the affiliate abroad. 
Underestimation of real capital formation results from the fact that the local financing 
(component iv) is excluded from FDI-flow figures. 
In the case of the CEECs, over- and under-estimation effects of real capital by FDI-flows 
tend to exist but should be rather small. Profit shifting might play a certain role, as the 
CEECs are low-tax countries in general, but underestimation due to local new equity 
financing is probably of minor importance.2
Thus, we are left with ‘local loans’ as the most serious remaining source of under-estimating 
real capital. Falcetti et al. (2003) reported that the ratio of total domestic credit to annual 
GDP was only 43.2 per cent in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, while it was 
108.8 per cent in the Euro Area on average. Still in 2005, the EBRD’s Transition Report 
concludes on “financial sector vulnerabilities in Hungary”, one of the most advanced 
countries of the CEEC-8. 
In summary, we are convinced that, due to the minor importance of local financing, net-FDI-
outflows to the CEECs are a reasonable proxy for the annual real capital formation of 
affiliates abroad.  
 
Independent Variables 
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6
The independent variables have to be valid proxies for host-country related Location-
advantages. We base our choice of independent variables on the findings of some recent and 
widely cited studies which, however, use a somewhat different operationalisation. We group 
the location advantages as follows:  
 market-related variables: host market size, distance, common border, 
 efficiency-oriented location factors: unit labour costs, effective tax rate, 
 transition-specific location factors: inflation, privatisation, political risk. 
Moreover, as we use a gravity setting we also include home country size.  
The larger a home country, the greater the potential for FDI outflows ceteris paribus, which 
suggests a positive coefficient on home country size (gdphome). With a larger market, there 
is a greater likelihood that MNEs will be able to recoup the costs of their FDI (Navaretti and 
Venables 2004). We therefore expect a positive sign of the estimated coefficient of host 
market size (gdphost).  
While a larger distance (dist) between home and host country may encourage FDI due to an 
Internalisation-advantage it may also discourage FDI due to the lack of market know-how, 
higher communications and information costs and differences in culture and institutions 
(Buch and Lipponer 2004). Hence, from a theoretical point of view the sign on the distance 
coefficient is ambiguous a priori (see Markusen and Maskus 2002). Here, we expect a 
negative sign as intra-firm trade flows between parent and affiliate tend to be high in the case 
of vertical FDI (VFDI) where the costs of re-exporting are an important determinant of 
overall cost. Secondly, even with horizontal FDI (HFDI), distance matters. If affiliates are 
relatively new, as is often the case in the CEECs they typically depend on headquarter 
services and intermediate inputs supplied by the parent. Thirdly, the negative impact of 
 
2 Rather, in many cases it is the other way round, i.e. a listed acquired firm is de-listed from the stock exchange 
after the acquisition by a foreign MNE, in order to gain 100% ownership. 
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7
distance on FDI has been shown by many empirical studies, notably by Markusen and 
Maskus (2002), who discriminate between various theories of FDI. 
As explained above the average tax rate is the relevant measure of tax burden for discrete 
choices like the location decision of MNEs. Moreover, for international investment decisions 
beatrs are the relevant location factor to reflect the tax component of the location decision of 
MNEs. As taxes are a cost we expect a negative sign on the estimated coefficients.  
Privatisation revenues on an annual basis (privrev) are used to reflect progress in 
privatisation. We expect a positive sign on the estimated coefficient, as a higher degree of 
privatisation implies more investment opportunities for foreign investors arising from first-
mover advantage, competition effects etc. In our view this variable is a better measure of 
privatisation progress than the index of the private-sector’s share in the total economy, as 
published by the EBRD, which is sometimes used. This index exhibits little variation over 
time as it varies, if at all, only in steps of 5 percentage points, so that it may underestimate 
the actual progress of privatisation.  
Our labour cost variable is a measure of real unit labour costs in a common currency (ulc). 
According to public opinion, low labour costs are among the most important determinants of 
inward FDI in the CEEC-8. This reasoning is in line with evidence reported in Hunya (2004) 
inter alia, who suggests that after the first wave of vertical FDI in the CEECs, FDI has 
shifted “further East” within, and across, the CEECs due to increasing labour costs. In 
general, high labour costs in the host country should exert a negative impact on FDI. Should 
the coefficient carry a positive sign, this could be an indication of an omitted variable 
problem, as in this case labour costs may capture effects of an increasing level of skill in the 
host country.  
In countries in transition, property rights may be insecure and political stability may be low. 
Hence, political risk may play a role as a determinant of FDI, too. As Navaretti and Venables 
(2004, p. 6) argue “political risk and instability seems to be an important deterrent to inward 
FDI”. Political instability could seriously deteriorate the investment climate of a CEE host 
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8
country and thus cause losses for foreign investors. We expect a negative relationship 
between political risk and FDI but a positive coefficient due to the measurement of political 
risk ranging from 0 (highest risk) to 25 (lowest risk).  
Inflation (pp) is included as a proxy for macroeconomic instability, which transition 
countries may be confronted with (Buch and Lipponer 2004). We expect a negative sign on 
the estimated coefficients.  
A common-border dummy-variable is considered in addition to dist, as centre-to-centre 
distance may overstate the effective distance between home and host countries (Head 2003). 
We expect a positive sign on the estimated coefficient.  
Tariffs (tar) are defined as the ratio of tariff revenues over imports of goods and services. 
From a theoretical point of view the sign of the coefficient on this variable is ambiguous a
priori depending on the underlying motive for FDI. If the observed FDI is mainly HFDI, the 
market imperfection theory of FDI suggests a positive sign. In this case HFDI is observed 
due to an Internalisation-advantage (“tariff-jumping” FDI). If, on the other hand, FDI is 
mainly VFDI, theory suggests a negative sign (e.g. Frenkel et al. 2004; Navaretti and 
Venables 2004). In the case of VFDI high trade costs can be seen as a location disadvantage, 
which deters FDI.  
Table 1 summarises the discussion of individual location factors.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
Descriptive data analysis 
Our data set constitutes a balanced panel of bilateral net-FDI-outflows for seven home 
countries (i), eight host countries (j) and nine years (t), resulting in 504 observations. 
However, as bilateral net-FDI-outflows can be negative, and the log of FDI is used as the 
dependent variable, we are obliged to drop 45 observations (about 9 percent of our data set). 
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9
The search for unsystematic outliers3 in the dependent and independent variables via box-
plots and added variable plots pinpoints four data points as potential outliers which are also 
dropped from the analysis. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our dataset and reveals 
that the between variability is higher than the within variability. Our variable of interest, the 
beatr, has an overall mean of 34.8 percent and ranges between 16 percent (Austria – 
Bulgaria in 2002) and 56 percent (Italy – Czech Republic in 1995). The broad range is not 
only due to large differences in the statutory tax rates of the home and the host countries but 
also due to large differences in the withholding tax rates on dividends and interests as well as 
in allowances. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
4. Empirical Specification and Methodology 
The basic panel-gravity-model includes the logarithm of home country and host market size, 
distance, country-pair specific effects as well as time dummies (Cheng and Wall 2004; Egger 
and Pfaffermayr 2003).4 The estimated model is a generalised panel-gravity model with 
various location factors added. It is shown in equation (1). 
ijtijtjtijijtijjtitijt eWbZbXbDISTbYbYbFDI ++++++++= 654321 lnlnlnln (1) 
where: 
lnFDIijt is the log of net-FDI-outflow from home country i to host country j at time t (lnfdi); 
lnYit is the log of GDP in country i at time t and the same for lnYjt for country j (lngdphome and lngdphost); 
lnDISTij is the log of the distance between countries i and j (lndist); 
Xijt are location factors which vary between country-pairs and over time (e.g. beatr); 
Zij are location factors which vary over country-pairs only (i.e. combord); 
Wjt are location factors which vary over time and over host countries (e.g. pp); 
Jt are time dummies (TD); 
 
3 We define unsystematic outliers as data points which do not represent heterogeneity between the host countries. 
For example, using box plots the ulc for Slovenia are shown to be extreme values throughout the sample period. 
Hence, these data represent heterogeneity between the host countries which we exploit in our analysis. 
4 These variables may be called “gravity-specific”. 
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Kij are country-pair-specific effects; 
eijt is the remainder error term. 
 
We regard the country-pair specific effects as random for two reasons. First, Hausman-tests5
on fixed versus random effects show that the random effects assumptions cannot be rejected. 
Hence, using the random effects estimator results in more efficient estimates than the fixed 
effects estimator, which can be inefficient as the cross-section dimension is large relative to 
the time dimension (Pesaran et al. 1998). Using the random effects approach is in line with 
several recent studies dealing with FDI, trade or capital flows to CEECs (e.g. Clausing and 
Dorobantu 2005; Dawson and Hubbard 2004; Bevan and Estrin 2004; Gibson and 
Tsakalotos 2004) and it allows estimating the impact of time fixed variables (i.e. dist and 
combord) on FDI-flows. Second, from a more substantive point of view, the random effects 
approach is relevant here as we are concerned with the decision of MNEs between various 
host countries. In this decision, differences between country-pairs matter, which are 
exploited by the random effects estimator. Concerning time effects we consider these to be 
fixed. They account inter alia for the business cycle, for common shocks and common trends 
(Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003). 
Our estimation strategy is based on two pillars. We first estimate equation (1) with the 
gravity-specific variables only and include the beatr. Then we introduce additional location 
factors stepwise to this basic specification (“pillar 1” strategy). Second, we apply a general 
to specific strategy, starting with the most general model (1) and test down until a 
specification is reached with all significant6 variables included (“pillar 2” strategy). This 
procedure should reduce the probability of an omitted variable bias and it provides 
information about the robustness of the tax-rate elasticity. An additional robustness and 
stability analysis (see below) is carried out via the jackknife procedure with respect to host 
 
5 We perform two types of Hausman-tests. First, if no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity seem to be present 
and if the other requirements of the original Hausman-test are fulfilled (e.g. the difference between fixed effects 
and random effects variance matrices is invertible) we use the original Hausman-test. Second, in case of non-
spherical errors or a non-positive definite difference in the fixed effects and random effects variance matrices we 
follow Wooldridge (2002, p. 290ff.) and perform a regression based Hausman-test (with cluster robust standard 
errors). 
6 significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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countries included and via interacting the coefficient on beatr, ulc and privrev with a dummy 
for the period 2000-2003. We always test for the presence of serial correlation in linear panel 
data models (Wooldridge-test, Wooldridge 2002) and heteroskedasticity (LM-test, Verbeek 
2004) in the residual error term. Furthermore, we inspect standard errors from different types 
of robust covariance estimates (non-robust, White-robust; cluster-robust). In case statistical 
tests do not show the presence of non-spherical residuals but the significance of our 
estimates changes when more robust standard errors are used, we also present these results 
for comparison reasons (cf. models 2b and 4b below). 
 
5. Results 
Tax-rate elasticities using effective tax rates 
Table 3 shows the results of our “pillar 1” strategy. The coefficients on the gravity-specific 
variables are always significant with the expected signs, with the exception of home-country 
size. The magnitude of the coefficients on distance and host-market size is reasonable as they 
are in line with the theoretical prediction of the gravity model and with empirical evidence 
for gravity models explaining international trade flows (Head 2003; Leamer and Levinsohn 
1995). In some models, the relatively low and statistically insignificant coefficient on home-
country size is not unexpected as relatively small countries (Austria and The Netherlands) 
are among the main source countries of FDI to CEECs.  
The coefficient on beatr is always statistically significant and negative, and falls in the range 
–3.3 and -4.6 (–5.7 excluding time dummies). Concerning other location factors considered, 
only privrev and ulc have a statistically significant impact on net-FDI-outflows. All other 
location factors carry the expected sign and the magnitude of their coefficients seems to be 
economically meaningful, but they are statistically insignificant.7 The positive sign on tar 
does suggest the tariff jumping motive for FDI. But the insignificance of tar is plausible as 
 
7 For example, the coefficient on combord implies that sharing a border increases net-FDI-outflows by about 
67%, a typical value for gravity models explaining international trade-flows (Head 2003).  
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tariffs were brought down considerably during the first part of the 1990s and, hence, are of 
minor importance throughout our sample period.  
The insignificant coefficient on inflation points to the fact that inflation has decreased 
considerably in the CEEC-8 compared to earlier periods of transition. Studies including 
earlier years and countries in macroeconomic turbulence (e.g. Edmiston et al. 2003) reveal 
significant negative effects of inflation on FDI-flows. Political stability (risk) does not seem 
to be a relevant location factor within the CEEC-8. This is in marked contrast to studies 
using data from the beginning of the transformation process till the end of the 1990ies (e.g. 
Carstensen and Toubal 2004; Frenkel et al. 2004). Furthermore, statistical tests show that 
time dummies are mostly jointly significant and that the random effects assumption can not 
be rejected. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Turning to our “pillar 2” strategy, the results are reported in table 4. Model 8 is our most 
general model including all location factors as well as time dummies. The results are not 
very different from those of our „pillar 1“ strategy: beatr, privrev and ulc are statistically 
significant with the expected signs, while all the other variables have the expected signs but 
are statistically insignificant. Moreover the magnitude of the estimates is in line with those of 
our „pillar 1“ strategy. 
Dropping insignificant variables step-by-step beginning with the most insignificant variable 
and controlling for possible multi-collinearity effects we finally end up with model 9. This 
includes the gravity-specific variables as well as beatr, ulc (both efficiency-related) and 
privrev (transition specific). Again, statistical tests show that the random effects specification 
is valid. Further tests suggest that model 9 has satisfactory properties from a statistical point 
of view. Studentised residuals do not show the presence of outliers using a cut off-level of 
+/- 3.5 (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003), the highest variance inflation factor of 3.95 implies 
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that multi-collinearity should not be a problem in model 9 and a Reset-test suggests that our 
linear specification is sufficient. Finally a regression based Hausman-test for endogeneity of 
our privatisation variable in model 9, using the index of the private-sector share in the total 
economy as well as dummies for the method of privatisation as instruments (see Carstensen 
and Toubal 2004 and below) does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (p-value = 
0.38).  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The tax-rate elasticity in model 9 is –4.48 implying that a 1 percentage-point decrease in the 
effective tax rate increases net-FDI-outflows, ceteris paribus, by about 4.4 per cent, which, 
evaluated at the mean net-FDI-outflow of € 193.5 m., amounts to € 8.5 m. on average. Thus, 
in the past, tax-lowering strategies of governments in the CEECs have had an important 
effect on the allocation of FDI among the CEEC-8.  
The derived semi-elasticity is higher than the median value concerning CEECs reported 
above and it is lower than those reported by DeMooij and Ederveen (2003 and 2005). As the 
study by Carstensen and Toubal (2004) partly covers the same countries as well as a similar 
time period, it is convenient to compare our results to those of their study. Their study is also 
based on bilateral FDI data. The comparable median value of their semi-elasticities is -1.6 
and is thus lower than ours in absolute value. It must be kept in mind, however, that besides 
other differences to our study Carstensen and Toubal base their analysis on statutory tax 
rates. 
To conclude the discussion on efficiency-related variables we take a closer look at the 
impact of ulc on net-FDI-outflows. Model 9 shows that a one percentage-point increase in 
ulc reduces net-FDI-outflows by about 3.1 percent. Comparing this estimate with those of 
other studies is notoriously difficult, as almost every study uses an alternative definition of 
 
8 The mean value of all estimates is about -4.0. 
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labour costs. Lansbury et al. (1994) use unit labour costs in a host country relative to other 
potential hosts in Central Europe and find that is has a significant and negative impact on 
FDI. Inclusion of relative wage and relative productivity measures as in Holland and Pain 
(1998) appears to leave only the relative wage variable significant. Productivity differentials 
across host countries do not appear significant. According to the authors this implies “that 
considerations of comparative factor costs across countries influence some investment 
decisions” (p. 16). Clausing and Dorobantu (2005) measure labour costs by the average 
compensation rate in the host country and also find a negative effect throughout. Some 
studies (e.g., Benassy-Quere et al., 2005, p. 590) even find a positive relationship between 
FDI and labour costs, which is most likely attributable to an omitted variable problem. The 
authors themselves state, that “unit labour costs are positively related to the quality of 
labour.” (ibidem, p. 589) Hence labour costs include the impact different skill levels may 
exert upon FDI-flows. 
Concerning the privatisation process, our analysis shows a significant and positive impact of 
privrev throughout. At first sight, the coefficient on privrev, although significant and with 
the correct sign, seems very low; ceteris paribus, net-FDI-outflows increase by about 0.03% 
if privatisation revenues increase by one million euro. Yet, given that foreign MNEs have 
been active in the CEEC-8 for some time now and that privatisation programmes are far 
advanced, the share of FDI unrelated to privatisation processes per se should have increased. 
This is what our result indicates. 
Other studies use the EBRD’s private-sector share in total economy (see Lansbury et al. 
1996, Holland and Pain 1998; Carstensen and Toubal 2004) and/or the method of 
privatisation (Holland and Pain 1998; Carstensen and Toubal 2004) to capture the effect of 
the privatisation process on FDI. Using the private sector share often results in insignificant 
coefficients, partly because the share variable does not vary much over time. In Carstensen 
and Toubal (2004) and Holland and Pain (1998) the “method of privatisation” (i.e. vouchers 
vs. other methods) turns out to have a significant effect on FDI inflows. Holland and Pain 
conclude that “countries with a program of direct privatisation through cash sales have 
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attracted relatively higher inward investment than those countries using voucher 
privatisation.” (p. 16) Clearly, the studies quoted here cover earlier time periods.  
 
Relative importance of effective tax rates as a location factor  
Table 5 shows the Beta coefficients corresponding to model 9.9 The gravity-specific 
variables are the most important determinants of net-FDI-outflows. This result is in line with 
many other studies (e.g. Mold 2003). Taxation and privatisation are equally important 
location factors, while unit labour costs are slightly less important. These results imply that 
the role of taxes should not be over-emphasised relative to that of other location 
determinants. 
 
An alternative measure of the corporate income tax burden 
In order to check our argument that the appropriate tax rate is the effective tax rate we 
replace the beatr by the statutory tax rate in model 9. Results for model 10 (reported in table 
5) show the expected substantial drop of the semi-elasticity to about -2.4, although this 
estimate falls short of statistical significance at the 5% level. This implies that the relatively 
low value of the semi-elasticity derived in our meta-analysis is partly due to the use of 
statutory tax rates in empirical studies. This result is also important with regard to evaluating 
the effectiveness of governments’ tax cuts, which might have had a larger effect on inward 
FDI than earlier studies have revealed.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Robustness and stability analysis 
 
9 These are calculated by applying the usual formula for standardised coefficients on the random effects estimates 
using the overall standard deviations for the random effects transformed variables of model 9.  
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We check the robustness of our preferred specification in model 9 against the impact of 
possible cross-section outliers by dropping host countries stepwise (e.g. Winner 2005). Table 
6 reports the resulting minimum and maximum values of the coefficient estimates and the 
coefficient derived from our preferred specification (model 9) as well as the country 
excluded. The results are robust with respect to dropping countries as no coefficient changes 
sign and none becomes insignificant at the 10% level with the exception of the coefficient on 
ulc when Slovenia is excluded (not shown). Hence, the relatively low FDI-flows to Slovenia 
may be partly due to the high unit labour costs when compared to other host countries in our 
sample. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The stability of the coefficients on beatr, ulc and privrev is checked by combining these 
variables with a dummy variable for the years 2000-2003. The year 2000 has been chosen as 
some host countries (notably Romania and the Slovak Republic) started to reduce their beatr 
since 2000. Table 7 (models 11 to 13) shows that the semi-elasticities for beatr and ulc for 
the period 2000-2003 are not significantly different from that of previous years, but that the 
importance of privatisation as a driver of FDI is significantly lower from 2000 onwards. This 
last result seems to be plausible as the privatisation process levelled off in many CEECs 
around 2000 (EBRD transition report, various issues). In contrast, the sensitivity of FDI with 
respect to taxation and unit labour costs has not changed during this period. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
6. Summary 
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The aim of this paper was to test the hypothesis that a high corporate tax burden acts as a 
deterrent to FDI-flows, since it exerts a negative effect on the profitability of investments. 
We suggest that using the statutory tax rate in previous studies might blur the effects of the 
tax burden on FDI and lead to questionable results. Therefore, we use the bilateral effective 
average tax rates to explaining net-FDI-outflows from the 7 most important home countries 
to the CEEC-8. Referring to the eclectic paradigm as a conceptual basis, we find in a panel-
gravity setting that FDI is positively related to both source country and host-market size as 
well as to progress in privatisation. Also, FDI is inversely related to the distance separating 
home and host countries, to the corporate tax burden and to unit labour costs. Concerning the 
role of taxes three points are worth noting:  
 
First, the derived tax-elasticity is robust across various specifications and is greater in 
absolute value than those reported in earlier studies on the CEECs, pointing to a greater 
importance of tax policy for company location decisions than previously acknowledged.  
Second, the differences in the absolute value of the semi-elasticities when compared to 
earlier studies are clearly partly due to the use of beatrs. The derived semi-elasticity after 
replacing the beatr by statrate in our study is, indeed, substantially lower.  
Third, the relative importance of the corporate tax rate as a determinant of FDI must not be 
over-emphasised as our results (Beta-coefficients) reveal that at least during the period 1995-
2003 the tax burden had no exceptional influence on net-FDI-outflows to the CEEC-8 when 
compared to other determinants. 
While this study is a step towards a greater understanding of FDI-flows to the CEECs, there 
are several limitations to our analysis; in particular, we are conscious of the exclusion of 
location factors such as the size and quality of public infrastructure. This omission is due to 
the lack of meaningful data. Moreover, special investment incentives (e.g. regional, R&D) 
are not included, as many different incentives have been granted by CEEC governments 
throughout the sample period of nine years. The choice of incentives to be included in the 
beatr would be arbitrary. Finally, many CEECs have reduced their special investment 
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incentives to MNEs during our survey period in accordance with the aquis communautaire of 
the EU. For example, Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) reported that, in Hungary, special tax 
incentives for MNEs have increasingly been phased out, or that domestic and foreign firms 
are now treated equally. Further research should focus on a meaningful operationalisation of 
these factors.  
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Table 1: Country-level Location Factors related to Market- and Efficiency-oriented FDI 
 
Source Variable Expected 
Sign 
Market-specific 
(a) gdphomeit§ Eurostat: New Cronos database Home country size 
measured as GDP home 
country in €m. 
+
(b) gdphostjt§ Eurostat: New Cronos database Host market size 
measured as GDP host 
country in €m. 
+
Efficiency-specific 
(c) distij§ http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm Distance in kilometres – 
(i) combordij Maps Common border; 
Dummy variable: 1 if 
common border 
+
(d) beatrijt Our own calculations based on Devereux and 
Griffith 1999; assumptions follow Devereux and 
Griffith except that we give investment in inventory 
less and investment in buildings more weight, as 
data for the CEECs show that investment in 
inventories is of minor importance; tax data are 
taken from the European Tax Handbook and 
KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Surveys 
Bilateral effective 
average tax rate; 
measured in per cent 
–
(e) ulcjt Own calculations based on van Ark and Monnikhof 
2000; data are taken from the AMECO database and 
the WIIW database 
Real unit labour costs in 
common currency 
(Euro); measured in per 
cent 
–
Transition-specific 
(f) privrevjt Own calculations; EBRD: Transition Report Annual privatisation 
revenues in €m. 
+
(g) riskjt Euromoney Political Risk; index 
ranging from 0 to 25 
+
(h) ppjt EBRD: Transition Report Inflation measured as the 
percentage increase in 
producer prices. 
–
(i) tarjt Own calculations; ratio of taxes and duties on 
imports excluding VAT over imports of goods and 
services; Eurostat: New Cronos database 
Percentage tariffs on 
imports. 
?
§ these variables are the “core” gravity variables 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
lnfdi overall 4.02 1.75 -0.43 7.81 N = 449 
between 1.39 1.66 7.19 n = 56 
within 1.11 0.60 7.94 T = 8.02 
lngdphome overall 13.90 1.10 12.11 16.24 N = 449 
between 1.12 12.20 16.09 n = 56 
within 0.14 13.43 14.24 T = 8.02 
lngdphost overall 10.40 0.76 8.96 12.24 N = 449 
between 0.75 9.38 11.94 n = 56 
within 0.21 9.93 10.88 T = 8.02 
lndist overall 6.99 0.98 4.03 9.15 N = 449 
between 0.99 4.03 9.15 n = 56 
within 0.00 6.99 6.99 T = 8.02 
beatr overall 34.79 7.43 16.11 55.92 N = 449 
between 5.37 24.07 48.07 n = 56 
within 5.08 17.52 47.06 T = 8.02 
ulc overall 24.61 9.23 11.00 50.00 N = 449 
between 8.77 15.42 46.14 n = 56 
within 2.89 15.61 32.41 T = 8.02 
privrev overall 1223.80 1157.48 58.16 4570.03 N = 449 
between 908.25 93.03 2712.47 n = 56 
within 739.74 -19.38 4375.46 T = 8.02 
pp overall 28.08 112.81 -1.20 901.80 N = 449 
between 43.94 1.92 154.04 n = 56 
within 104.10 -122.55 803.66 T = 8.02 
risk overall 13.88 3.32 5.32 19.82 N = 449 
between 2.90 9.59 17.48 n = 56 
within 1.64 7.73 17.39 T = 8.02 
tar overall 4.34 3.83 0.50 18.45 N = 449 
between 3.07 0.95 11.71 n = 56 
within 2.28 -0.17 13.43 T = 8.02 
combord overall 0.31 0.33 0.00 1.00 N = 449 
between 0.33 0.00 1.00 n = 56 
within 0.00 0.13 0.13 T = 8.02 
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Table 3: „Pillar 1“ Results 
Model_1 Model_2a Model_2b 
lngdphome 0.29026 0.34597** 0.46472***
(1.78) (2.48) (3.21)
lngdphost 1.27140*** 1.34399*** 1.44075***
(8.02) (8.99) (10.70)
lndist -0.60524*** -0.67522*** -0.76821***
(-3.28) (-4.35) (-4.55)
beatr -0.03476*** -0.04636*** -0.05685***
(-2.85) (-3.42) (-5.80)
ulc -0.03316*** ulc -0.03439*** 
(-2.88) (-2.99)
cons               -7.74253*** -7.59421*** -9.21078***
(-3.34) (-3.94) (-4.70)
N 449 N                          449 N 449
R2 within = 0.2960 
 between =  0.5913 
 overall =  0.4638 
R2 within = 0.2957 
 between  = 0.6485
overall = 0.4981
R2 within = 0.2516
between  = 0.6493
overall = 0.4818
AR(1): 21 = 1.232 21 = 1.207 21 = 2.005
Het.: 212 = 18.39 213 = 19.07 25 = 8.966
TD: 28 = 24.01*** 28 = 13.45 not included
a
Hausman: 23 = 5.88 24 = 8.32 24 = 7.69
BP: 21 = 226.88*** 21 = 162.35*** 21 = 153.38***
Model_3 Model_4a Model_4b 
lngdphome 0.28124                        0.27291 0.40092**
(1.81)                          (1.65) (2.52)
lngdphost 0.98886***                 1.23147*** 1.32896***
(5.98)                          (6.96) (8.14)
lndist -0.59529***               -0.57739*** -0.67614***
(-2.84)                         (-3.03) (-3.61)
beatr -0.03379***  -0.03512*** -0.04482***
(-2.84)                         (-2.44) (-4.68)
privrev 0.00029*** risk 0.02111 risk 0.02252
(4.29)                          (0.58) (0.73)
cons                 -5.03765**               -7.59143*** -9.38413***
(-2.19)                        (-3.61) (-4.36)
N 449 N                           449 N                            449
R2 within = 0.3205 
 between = 0.6248 
 overall = 0.4927 
R2 within = 0.2984 
 between  = 0.5834 
 overall= 0.4601
R2 within = 0.2549
between  = 0.5813
overall = 0.4416
AR(1): 21 = 1.304 21 = 0.935 21 = 1.737
Het.: 213 = 20.78 213 = 19.99 25 = 7.480
TD: 28 = 29.21*** 28 = 15.43 not included
a
Hausman: 24 = 5.4 24 = 8.88 24 = 7.38
BP: 21 = 213.27*** 21 = 210.83*** 21 = 196.99***
a Model_2a and model_4a: cluster robust standard errors change significance of time dummies but not that of 
other variables. Model_2b and model_4b hence exclude time dummies. 
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Table 3: „Pillar 1“ Results (cont’) 
 
Model_5 Model_6 Model_7 
lngdphome 0.28021                    0.32341**                                  0.23844 
(1.70) (2.04) (1.40)
lngdphost 1.24630***                  1.37563***                             1.25056*** 
(7.66) (8.17) (7.80)
lndist -0.59275***                -0.65996***                              -0.45979** 
(-3.16) (-3.86) (-2.01)
beatr -0.03254**  -0.03440***  -0.03472*** 
(-2.61) (-2.76) (-2.84)
pp -0.00044 tar 0.04499 combord 0.51741 
(-0.86) (1.43) (1.08)
cons                        -7.48229***                -9.04955***                           -7.87836*** 
(-3.17) (-3.78) (-3.37)
N 449 N                          449 N                                      449 
R2 within: 0.2980 
 between: 0.5894 
 overall: 0.4633 
R2 within = 0.3004 
 between = 0.5949 
 overall = 0.4671 
R2 within = 0.2964 
 between = 0.5990 
 overall = 0.4677 
AR(1): 21 = 1.193 21 = 1.209 21 = 1.232 
Het.: 213 = 18.40 213  = 26.109** 213 = 19.259 
TD: 28 = 24.52*** 28 = 28.33*** 28 = 24.59*** 
Hausman: 24 = 8.92 24 = 7.36 24 = 5.55 
BP: 21 = 227.50*** 21 = 228.82*** 21 = 213.27*** 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; t-values in parenthesis; Het: LM-test for heteroskedasticity in fixed effects model; TD: 
time dummies; BP: Breusch-Pagan-test for random individual effects; Hausman: Hausman-test or Hausman-
Wooldridge-test for fixed vs. random effects; AR(1): Wooldridge-test for serial correlation in linear panel data 
models 
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Table 4: „Pillar 2“ Results 
Model_8 Model_9 
lngdphome 0.24030 0.32967**
(1.61) (2.27)
lngdphost 0.99097*** 1.05707***
(5.58) (6.63)
lndist -0.42646** -0.65757***
(-2.18) (-4.35)
beatr -0.04360*** -0.04370***
(-3.51) (-3.50)
privrev 0.00028*** 0.00029***
(3.54) (3.79)
ulc -0.03739*** -0.03076***
(-3.26) (-2.67)
combord 0.73066 
(1.81)
pp -0.00083 
(-1.58)
risk 0.03424 
(1.10)
tar 0.02148 
(0.67)
cons                         -5.06197** -4.898357**
(-2.27) (-2.20)
N 449 N                        449
R2 within = 0.3311 
 between = 0.6776
overall = 0.5280 
R2 within = 0.3235
between = 0.6603
overall = 0.5155
AR(1): 21 = 0.960 21 = 1.276
Het.: 218 =                35.593*** 214 = 21.535
TD: 28 = 29.66*** 28 = 28.32***
Hausman: 28 = 10.32 213                               13.35
BP: 21 = 151.79*** 21 = 175.14***
Reset: 23 = 5.04
stud.res      >     |3.5|: 0 
Highest VIF:        3.95 
Hausman-test for endogeneity 1st stage F-value = 10.65 
2nd stage p-value = 0.38 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; t-values in parenthesis; stud.res: studentized residuals; VIF: variance inflation factor; 
Het: LM-test for heteroskedasticity in fixed effects model; TD: time dummies; BP: Breusch-Pagan-test for 
random individual effects; Hausman: Hausman-test or Hausman-Wooldridge-test for fixed vs. random effects; 
AR(1): Wooldridge-test for serial correlation in linear panel data models; Reset: Ramsey-functional-form-test 
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Table 5: Beta Coefficients and Statutory Tax Rate 
 
Beta Coeff. Model_10 
lngdphome 0.173 0.26277
(1.69)
lngdphost 0.396 1.04806***
(6.15)
lndist -0.261 -0.60497***
(-3.67)
beatr -0.192 statrate                    -0.02360 
(-1.78); p = 5.1
privrev 0.191  0.00027***
(3.57)
ulc -0.115  -0.02546**
(-2.09)
cons                                 Y -5.057145**
(-2.12)
N 449 N                                       449
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; t-values in parenthesis; Overall standard deviations from random effects transformed 
variables are used to calculate beta coefficients. The values used are: 1.264 (lnfdi), 0.664 (lngdphome), 0.474 
(lngdphost), 0.502 (lndist), 5.552 (beatr), 832.988 (privrev) and 4.716 (ulc). 
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Table 6: Jackknife Analysis 
 
Minimum 
(in absolute value) 
Host country  
excluded 
Estimate 
 
Maximum 
(in absolute value) 
Host country 
excluded 
beatr 
ulc 
privrev 
-3.17** (-2.45) 
-1.99* (-1.61) 
0.02** (2.64) 
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
-4.40*** 
-3.10*** 
0.03*** 
-5.80*** (-4.38) 
-4.40*** (-3.08) 
0.04*** (3.63) 
Croatia 
Romania 
Czech Republic 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; t-values in parenthesis 
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Table 7: Stability Analysis 
 
Model_11 Model_12 Model_13 
lngdphome 0.33443** 0.33157** 0.32780**
(2.54) (2.43) (2.41)
lngdphost 1.06292*** 1.01179*** 1.05694***
(5.97) (5.82) (5.95)
lndist -0.66290*** -0.66850*** -0.65628***
(-4.49) (-4.34) (-4.32)
beatr -0.04666*** -0.03725*** -0.04277***
(-2.93) (-2.89) (-3.14)
dummybeatr 0.00259 privrev 0.00044*** 0.00029***
(0.12) (4.75) (3.38)
privrev 0.00029*** dummypriv -0.00031*** ulc -0.03010** 
(3.39) (-2.79) (-2.36)
ulc -0.03126*** -0.02565** dummyulc -0.00219 
(-2.71) (-2.26) (-0.16)
cons                   -4.96785** -4.50656** -4.86455**
(-2.28) (-2.18) (-2.32)
N 449 N                                                  449 N 449
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; t-values in parenthesis 
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Do low corporate income tax rates attract FDI? – Evidence from Central- and 
East European Countries
1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is carried out by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in order 
to earn profits. The profitability of FDI is expected to decrease with increases in energy 
prices, taxes, labour costs etc. Concerning taxation, the negative relationship between tax 
burden and FDI inflows is basically confirmed by the empirical evidence for OECD 
countries. (e.g. DeMooij and Ederveen 2003 and 2005) However, the empirical evidence 
concerning FDI and taxation in the Central- and East European Countries (CEECs) has 
consistently not found evidence that taxes matter for location decisions (see below).
We suggest that one possible reason for this somewhat unexpected evidence for the CEECs 
in the empirical FDI-taxation literature is due to the use of a flawed indicator of tax burden. 
These flaws, we argue, can be remedied.
The present paper differs from previous studies by including a theoretically well founded 
measure of the tax burden, namely forward-looking effective tax rates derived by Devereux 
and Griffith (1999), rather than the statutory tax rate, which has various shortcomings in 
explaining FDI.
In this paper we examine first of all whether there is any substance in the belief that 
corporate tax rates are an important location factor for FDI from 7 home countries to 8 
CEECs.1 Secondly, we investigate whether, and to what extent, the choice of measure of the 
tax burden affects the tax elasticity of FDI. This is mainly motivated by the fact that there 
has been a gap between the conceptually ideal measure of the tax burden and its operational 
counterpart in empirical models in earlier studies. Thirdly, we compare the role of the 
corporate tax burden to that of other location determinants. 
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2
Our empirical results show that the semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to taxation is about -
4.3. This is above those of earlier studies in absolute terms and can partly be attributed to 
using a superior measure of the corporate tax burden than the statutory tax rate. The results 
indicate that tax-lowering strategies of CEEC governments seem to have an important 
impact on foreign firms’ location decisions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some conceptual 
background and a review of previous studies. Section 3 describes our data set and the 
variables used. Section 4 describes the empirical specification and methodology used in the 
estimation. Section 5 presents the estimation results and discusses their significance in 
relation to earlier studies. Section 6 provides a summary of our main findings.
2. Some Conceptual Considerations and a Review of Previous Studies
The question why a particular country succeeds in competing for inward FDI can be 
answered by reference to the eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1988; Markusen 1995). With 
reference to various theories (e.g. Trade Theory, Theory of the Firm and Theory of Industrial 
Organisation) the eclectic paradigm avers that FDI emerges if a firm has an Ownership-
advantage (e.g. a patent) combined with a Location–advantage (e.g. low production costs; 
large market size) and an Internalisation-advantage (e.g. economies of interdependent 
activities). 
The particular location factors considered by the firm in choosing between different foreign 
markets have to be valid proxies for host-country Location-advantages. The eclectic 
paradigm incorporates all possible location factors which attract FDI conditional on a firm’s 
decision to undertake FDI. This poses a problem as it neither attributes weights to single 
location factors like taxation, nor does it assess their relative weights. Hence empirical 
1
 The home countries are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The host countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia (CEEC-8).
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3
applications based upon the eclectic paradigm have to rely on more or less ad hoc
specifications. 
Recently gravity-models have been used to explain not only bilateral trade-flows but also 
bilateral FDI-flows (e.g. Brainard 1997). These models can easily be combined with the 
eclectic paradigm. Empirical models explaining bilateral FDI-flows should be based on a 
Panel-gravity setting. 
Location-advantages can be classified in terms of factors which are efficiency-- or market-
related, supply and demand based (e.g. Mold 2003) or transition specific (Carstensen and 
Toubal 2004). Our variable of main interest, the corporate income tax burden, clearly falls 
into the efficiency and supply related categories.
As the tax burden is a factor which reduces profitability in the host-country, it should be 
negatively related to the inflow of FDI.2 In general, few studies have dealt with taxes as 
drivers of FDI to the CEECs. Recently, anonymous (2006a) surveyed eight papers, which 
dealt explicitly with FDI to the CEECs, in order to ascertain their tax-rate elasticities. The 
outcome suggests a median tax-rate elasticity of around -1.45 (semi-elasticity). This result 
implies that a 1 percentage point decrease in the tax rate will increase FDI inflows by 1.45 
percent. As almost all of the studies surveyed used statutory tax rates as a measure of the 
corporate tax burden, the result is in line with the tax-rate elasticities found by DeMooij and 
Ederveen (2003 and 2005), i.e. -1.2 and -2.05, respectively.
However, we question this low tax-rate elasticity. The statutory tax rate is not an appropriate 
indicator of the tax burden, especially in the case of FDI, because it does not include all 
relevant tax codes. From a conceptual and empirical point of view, bilateral forward-looking 
effective average tax rates (beatrs) should be used (Devereux and Griffith 1999 and 2002). 
2
 Having described the general relationship between FDI and lower taxes, the story could, however, be 
different on a more disaggregated level. We are grateful to the referee for raising this problem. First, 
footloose manufacturing sectors may react differently to service sectors. Second, different tax 
incentives etc. may apply on the sectoral level. Recently this issue was analysed empirically by 
Stöwhase (2005). He shows that the tax sensitivity of FDI depends crucially on the sector receiving 
the capital flow. This raises the possibility of an over- or underestimation of sectoral tax elasticities on 
the aggregate level. Given the difficulties of obtaining appropriate data at a reasonable scale at 
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4
Hence the estimated tax-rate elasticities from statutory tax-rates are probably flawed. In our 
study, we follow Devereux and Griffith (1999) and use beatrs. We expect a higher tax-rate 
elasticity than the one based on statutory tax rates as the meta-analyses by DeMooij and 
Ederveen (2003 and 2005) show tax-rate elasticities of -9.3 and -5.9 respectively, when 
effective average tax-rates are used.
In addition, the negative but low median semi-elasticity derived by anonymous (2006a) may 
also be explained inter alia by the following facts, which are partly transition-specific. First, 
since relatively little FDI is efficiency-oriented but most is horizontal FDI other location 
factors are believed to be important, too. In the case of the CEECs, location factors specific 
to the transition process such as hyper-inflation, privatisation, recession, etc. may play an 
important role. Second, the more varied the mix of location factors in competing host 
countries, the smaller should be the influence of a single factor such as taxation. It follows 
that the tax burden should be more important the more similar potential host countries are 
with respect to other location factors, ceteris paribus. Third, MNEs may avoid taxes via 
profit shifting. Fourth, insofar as FDI-flows contribute to expansionary investment in the 
existing capital stock, it may react less than in the case of new investment and Greenfield 
investment in particular.
3. Data and Variables 
Dependent Variable
The bilateral net-FDI-outflow in millions of euro from home country (i) to host country (j) 
for the years 1995 to 2003 (t), is used as the dependent variable (fdi). Data are mainly taken 
from the ‘OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook’ and the ‘OECD 
Foreign Direct Investment’ database. Missing values are substituted by information from 
Eurostat’s ‘New Cronos’ database and from National Statistical Offices.
present, we have not followed this strategy. As more data will become available in the future, sectoral 
analyses will show the size of the bias incurred.
Page 34 of 58
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5
The fact that we use net-FDI-outflows in our study requires some explanation, as criticism 
has frequently been directed at this measure. In particular, some authors argue that FDI-
flows reflect financial flows only and not necessarily real-capital formation in the host 
country (see Devereux and Griffith 2002, p. 84f.). These authors conclude that there is a 
superior measure, namely plant, property and equipment (PPE), which reflects real capital 
(fixed assets). 
In our view net-FDI-outflows indeed represent the annual decisions of MNEs, either to 
invest Greenfield or to acquire a foreign firm directly or to expand an existing affiliate or to 
divest in the CEECs. Net-FDI-outflows include (i) equity of the parent company in the 
subsidiary, (ii) net-loans between parent and affiliate, as well as (iii) reinvested earnings. In 
addition, local financing in the form of raising new capital, or taking loans, contributes to the 
affiliate’s capital (iv). Empirically, using FDI-flows as the dependent variable may thus 
overestimate or underestimate “real investment”. Overestimation may result from the fact 
that financial flows, which are unrelated to investment activities of the affiliate, may enter 
the components (i), (ii) or (iii). For example, transfer pricing via overvaluing services or 
goods by the affiliate inflates reinvested earnings. Another source of overestimation is the 
capital provided by the parent company to cover losses of the affiliate abroad. 
Underestimation of real capital formation results from the fact that the local financing 
(component iv) is excluded from FDI-flow figures.
In the case of the CEECs, over- and under-estimation effects of real capital by FDI-flows 
tend to exist but should be rather small. Profit shifting via transfer pricing might play a 
certain role, as the CEECs are low-tax countries in general, but underestimation due to local 
new equity financing is probably of minor importance.3
Thus, we are left with ‘local loans’ as the most serious remaining source of under-estimating 
real capital. Falcetti et al. (2003) reported that the ratio of total domestic credit to annual 
GDP was only 43.2 per cent in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, while it was 
3
 Rather, in many cases it is the other way round, i.e. a listed acquired firm is de-listed from the stock exchange 
after the acquisition by a foreign MNE, in order to gain 100% ownership.
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108.8 per cent in the Euro Area on average. Still in 2005, the EBRD’s Transition Report 
concludes on “financial sector vulnerabilities in Hungary”, one of the most advanced 
countries of the CEEC-8.
In summary, we are convinced that, due to the minor importance of local financing, net-FDI-
outflow to the CEECs is a reasonable proxy for the annual real capital formation of affiliates 
abroad. 
Independent Variables
The independent variables have to be valid proxies for host-country related Location-
advantages. We base our choice of independent variables on the findings of some recent and 
widely cited studies which, however, use a somewhat different operationalisation. We group 
the Location-advantages as follows: 
 market-related location factor: host market size 
 efficiency-related location factors: unit labour costs, effective tax rate, distance, 
common border
 transition-specific location factors: inflation, privatisation, political risk.
Moreover, as we use a gravity setting we also include home country size as another market-
related variable. 
The larger a home country, the greater the potential for FDI outflows ceteris paribus, which 
suggests a positive coefficient on home country size (gdphome). With a larger market, there 
is a greater likelihood that MNEs will be able to recoup the costs of their FDI (Barba 
Navaretti and Venables 2004). We therefore expect a positive sign of the estimated 
coefficient of host market size (gdphost). 
While a larger distance (dist) between home and host country may encourage FDI due to an 
Internalisation-advantage it may also discourage FDI due to the lack of market know-how, 
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7
higher communication and information costs and differences in culture and institutions 
(Buch and Lipponer 2004). Hence, from a theoretical point of view the sign on the distance 
coefficient is ambiguous a priori (see Markusen and Maskus 2002). Here, we expect a 
negative sign as intra-firm trade flows between parent and affiliate tend to be high in the case 
of vertical FDI (VFDI) where the costs of re-exporting are an important determinant of 
overall cost. Secondly, large distance will impact negatively even on horizontal FDI (HFDI). 
. If affiliates are relatively new, as is often the case in the CEECs they typically depend on 
headquarter services and intermediate inputs supplied by the parent. Thirdly, the negative 
impact of distance on FDI has been shown by many empirical studies, notably by Markusen 
and Maskus (2002), who discriminate between various theories of FDI.
As outlined above the average tax rate is the relevant measure of tax burden for discrete
choices like the location decision of MNEs. Moreover, for international investment decisions 
beatrs are the relevant location factors. As taxes are a cost we expect a negative sign on the 
estimated coefficients. 
Privatisation revenues on an annual basis (privrev) are used to reflect progress in 
privatisation. We expect a positive sign on th  estimated coefficient, as a higher degree of 
privatisation implies more investment opportunities for foreign investors arising from first-
mover advantages, competition effects etc. In our view this variable is a better measure of 
privatisation progress than the index of the private-sector’s share in the total economy, as 
published by the EBRD, which is sometimes used. This index exhibits little variation over 
time as it varies, if at all, only in steps of 5 percentage points, so that it may underestimate 
the actual progress of privatisation. 
Following anonymous (2006b) our labour cost variable is a measure of real unit labour costs 
in a common currency (ulc). According to public opinion, low labour costs are among the 
most important determinants of inward FDI in the CEEC-8. This reasoning is in line with 
evidence reported in Hunya (2004), who suggests that after the first wave of VFDI in the 
CEECs, FDI has shifted “further East” within and across the CEECs due to increasing labour 
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costs. In general, high labour costs in the host country should exert a negative impact on 
FDI.4
In countries in transition, property rights may be insecure and political stability may be low. 
Hence, political risk may play a role as a determinant of FDI. As Barba Navaretti and 
Venables (2004, p. 6) argue “political risk and instability seems to be an important deterrent 
to inward FDI”. Political instability could seriously deteriorate the investment climate of a 
CEEC and thus cause losses for foreign investors. We expect a negative relationship between 
political risk and FDI but a positive coefficient due to the measurement of political risk 
ranging from 0 (highest risk) to 25 (lowest risk). 
Inflation (pp) is included as a proxy for macroeconomic instability, which may occur 
especially in transition countries (Buch and Lipponer 2004). We expect a negative sign on 
the estimated coefficients. 
A common-border dummy-variable is considered in addition to dist, as centre-to-centre 
distance may overstate the effective distance between home and host countries (Head 2003). 
We expect a positive sign on the estimated coefficient. 
Tariffs (tar) are defined as the ratio of tariff revenues over imports of goods and services. 
From a theoretical point of view the sign of the coefficient on this variable is ambiguous a 
priori depending on the underlying motive for FDI. If the observed FDI is mainly HFDI, the 
market imperfection theory of FDI suggests a positive sign. In this case HFDI is observed 
due to an Internalisation-advantage (“tariff-jumping” FDI). If, on the other hand, FDI is 
mainly VFDI, theory suggests a negative sign (e.g. Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004). In 
the case of VFDI high trade costs can be seen as a Location-disadvantage, which deters FDI. 
Table 1 summarises the discussion of individual location factors. 
[Table 1 here]
4 Should the coefficient carry a positive sign, this could be an indication of an omitted variable problem, as in this 
case labour costs may capture effects of an increasing level of skill in the host country.
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Descriptive data analysis
Our data set constitutes a balanced panel of bilateral net-FDI-outflows for seven home 
countries (i), eight host countries (CEEC-8) (j) and nine years (t), resulting in 504 
observations. However, as bilateral net-FDI-outflows can be negative, and the log of FDI is
used as the dependent variable, we are obliged to drop 45 observations (about 9 percent of 
our data set). The search for unsystematic outliers5 in the dependent and independent 
variables via box-plots and added variable plots pinpoints four data points as potential 
outliers which are also dropped from the analysis. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for 
our dataset and reveals that the between variability is higher than the within variability. Our 
variable of interest, the beatr, has an overall mean of 34.8 percent and ranges between 16 
percent (Austria – Bulgaria in 2002) and 56 percent (Italy – Czech Republic in 1995). The 
broad range is not only due to large differences in the statutory tax rates of the home and the 
host countries but also due to large differences in the withholding tax rates on dividends and 
interests as well as in allowances. This again is a strong hint of the importance to exploit the 
considerable heterogeneity across host countri s and in bilateral relationships to their home 
countries.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the various location factors used in the empirical 
study. No correlation coefficient is above 0.8 in absolute value, which is often used as a 
threshold value. As low pairwise correlation coefficients are not sufficient for concluding 
that the variables are not highly multicollinear we provide further evidence using variance 
inflation factors in the empirical analysis (e.g. Kennedy 2003).
5
 We define unsystematic outliers as data points which do not represent heterogeneity between the host countries. 
For example, using box plots the ulc for Slovenia are shown to be extreme values throughout the sample period. 
Hence, these data represent heterogeneity between the host countries which we exploit in our analysis.
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[Table 3 here]
4. Empirical Specification and Methodology
The basic panel-gravity-model includes the logarithm of home country and host market size, 
distance, country-pair specific effects as well as time dummies (Egger and Pfaffermayr 
2003).6 The model applied is a generalised panel-gravity model with various location factors 
added. It is shown in equation (1).
ijtijtjtijijtijjtitijt eWbZbXbDISTbYbYbFDI ++++++++= 654321 lnlnlnln (1)
where:
lnFDIijt is the log of net-FDI-outflow from home country i to host country j at time t (lnfdi);
lnYit is the log of GDP in country i at time t and the same for lnYjt for country j (lngdphome and lngdphost);
lnDISTij is the log of the distance between countries i and j (lndist);
Xijt are location factors which vary between country-pairs and over time (e.g. beatr);
Zij are location factors which vary over country-pairs only (i.e. combord);
Wjt are location factors which vary over time and over host countries (e.g. pp);
t are time dummies (TD);
ij are country-pair-specific effects;
eijt is the remainder error term.
We regard the country-pair specific effects as random for two reasons. First, Hausman-tests7
on fixed versus random effects show that the random effects assumptions cannot be rejected. 
Hence, using the random effects estimator results in more efficient estimates than the fixed 
effects estimator, which can be highly inefficient if the cross-section dimension is large 
relative to the time dimension (Pesaran et al. 1998). Using the random effects approach is in 
line with several recent studies dealing with FDI, trade or capital flows to CEECs (e.g. 
Clausing and Dorobantu 2005; Dawson and Hubbard 2004; Bevan and Estrin 2004; Gibson 
6
 These variables may be called “gravity-specific”.
7
 We perform two types of Hausman-tests. First, if no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity seem to be present 
and if the other requirements of the original Hausman-test are fulfilled (e.g. the difference between fixed effects 
and random effects variance matrices is invertible) we use the original Hausman-test. Second, in case of non-
spherical errors or a non-positive definite difference in the fixed effects and random effects variance matrices we 
perform a regression based Hausman-test with cluster robust standard errors (see Wooldridge, 2002).
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and Tsakalotos 2004) and it allows estimating the impact of time fixed variables (i.e. dist and 
combord) on FDI-flows. Second, from a more substantive point of view, the random effects 
approach is relevant here as we are concerned with the decision of MNEs between various 
host countries. In this decision, differences between country-pairs matter, which are 
exploited by the random effects estimator. Concerning time effects we consider these to be 
fixed as they are likely to be correlated with gdphome and gdphost as time dummies account 
inter alia for the business cycle and for common shocks (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003).
Our estimation strategy is based on a general to specific approach. We start with the most 
general model (1) and test down until a specification is reached with only (at conventional 
levels) significant variables included. This procedure should reduce the probability of an 
omitted variable bias and it provides information about the robustness of the tax-rate 
elasticity.8 An additional robustness and stability analysis (see below) is carried out via the 
jackknife procedure with respect to host countries included. Furthermore we explore the 
stability of the coefficient on beatr, ulc and privrev over time. We always test for the 
presence of serial correlation in linear panel data models (“Wooldridge-test”, Wooldridge 
2002) and heteroskedasticity (LM-test, Verbeek 2004) in the remainder error term. In all 
cases the Wooldridge-test does not reject the null hypothesis. In cases heteroscedasticity is 
implied by the LM-test heteroscedasticity-robust standard-errors are used.
5. Results
Table 3 shows the results of our estimation strategy. Model 1 is our most general model 
including all location factors as well as time dummies. All coefficients carry the expected 
sign. The core gravity variables as well as beatr, privrev and ulc are highly statistically 
significant. Combord and pp are marginally insignificant at the 10 percent significance level 
(p-values of 0.102 and 0.11, respectively) using two-sided t-tests. Applying one-sided tests 
with the alternative hypothesis specified according to the expected sign of the coefficient (cf. 
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table 1) these two variables are significant at the 10 percent level. Risk and tar are highly 
insignificant even in the case of a one-sided test.
Dropping these two highly insignificant variables step-by-step beginning with the most 
insignificant variable (tar) we finally end up with model 2. This includes the gravity-specific 
variables as well as beatr, ulc, combord (efficiency-related), privrev and pp (transition 
specific). Pp is again marginally insignificant at the 10 percent significance level, but due to 
its p-value of 0.102, which implies statistical significance in case of a one-sided test, we 
decide to keep this variable in our preferred specification.9
The Hausman-Wooldridge-test implies that the random effects specification cannot be 
rejected. Further tests suggest that model 2 has satisfactory properties from a statistical point 
of view. Studentised residuals do not show the presence of outliers using a cut-off level of 
+/- 3.5 (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003), the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) of 5.40 
implies that multicollinearity should not be a problem in model 2 and a Reset-test suggests 
that our linear specification is sufficient. Finally, a regression based Hausman-test for 
endogeneity of privrev in model 2, using the EBRD’s index of the private-sector share in the 
total economy as well as dummies for the method of privatisation as instruments (see 
Carstensen and Toubal 2004 and below) does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients on distance and host-market size are reasonable as they 
are in line with the theoretical prediction of the gravity model and with empirical evidence 
for gravity models explaining international trade flows (Head 2003; Leamer and Levinsohn 
1995). The comparably low coefficient on home-country size is not unexpected as relatively 
small countries (Austria and The Netherlands) are among the main source countries of FDI 
to CEECs. Moreover, the coefficient on combord of about 0.68 implies that sharing a border 
increases net-FDI-outflows by about 97%, a value in line with those usually found for 
gravity models explaining international trade-flows (see Head 2003).
8 We also used a specific to general approach to asses the robustness of the tax-rate elasticity with respect to 
single location factors additionally included in the empirical model. The results show the robustness of our 
estimate in this respect but are not reported here. For details see anonymous (2005).
9
 Dropping pp does not change the results of our analysis. Details can be found in anonymous (2005).
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The coefficient on beatr is statistically significant and negative. The estimate of -4.30 signals 
a substantially larger impact of corporate income taxes on FDI than earlier studies imply. For 
example, a median semi-elasticity of about -1.6 can be deduced from the study by 
Carstensen and Toubal (2004), which partly covers the same countries as well as a similar 
time period. This estimate is thus substantially lower than ours in absolute value. However, it 
must be kept in mind, that besides other differences to our study Carstensen and Toubal base 
their analysis on statutory tax rates.
The tax-rate elasticity of -4.30 implies that a 1 percentage-point decrease in the effective tax 
rate increases net-FDI-outflows ceteris paribus by about 4.30 per cent. Evaluated at the 
mean net-FDI-outflow of € 193.5 m. this amounts to € 8.3 m. on average. Thus, in the past, 
tax-lowering strategies of governments in the CEECs had an important effect on the 
allocation of FDI among the CEEC-8. 
Model 2 shows that a one percentage-point increase in ulc reduces net-FDI-outflows by 
about 3.30 percent. Comparing this estimate with other studies is notoriously difficult, as 
almost every study uses an alternative definition of labour costs. Lansbury et al. (1994) use 
unit labour costs in a host country relative to other potential hosts in Central Europe and find 
that labour costs have a significant and negative impact on FDI. Inclusion of relative wage 
and relative productivity measures as in Holland and Pain (1998) appears to leave only the 
relative wage variable significant, while productivity differentials across host countries are 
not significant. According to the authors this implies “that considerations of comparative 
factor costs across countries influence some investment decisions” (p. 16). Clausing and 
Dorobantu (2005) measure labour costs by the average compensation rate in the host country 
and also find a negative effect throughout. Some studies (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005, p. 
590) even find a positive relationship between FDI and labour costs, which is most likely 
attributable to an omitted variable problem. The authors themselves state, that “unit labour 
costs are positively related to the quality of labour.” (ibidem, p. 589) Hence, labour costs 
may account for the impact of skill differentials across host countries.
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Concerning the privatisation process, our analysis shows a significant and positive impact of 
privrev. At first sight, the coefficient on privrev, although significant and with the correct 
sign seems very low: ceteris paribus, net-FDI-outflows increase by about 0.03% if 
privatisation revenues increase by one million euro. Yet, given that foreign MNEs have been 
active in the CEEC-8 for some time now and that privatisation programmes are far advanced, 
the share of FDI unrelated to privatisation processes per se should have increased.
Other studies including the privatisation process as a determinant of FDI use the EBRD’s 
private-sector share in total economy (see Lansbury et al. 1996, Holland and Pain 1998; 
Carstensen and Toubal 2004) and/or the method of privatisation (Holland and Pain 1998; 
Carstensen and Toubal 2004). Using the private sector share often results in insignificant 
coefficients, partly because the share variable does not vary much over time. In Carstensen 
and Toubal (2004) and Holland and Pain (1998) the “method of privatisation” (i.e. vouchers 
vs. other methods) turns out to have a significant effect on FDI inflows. Holland and Pain 
conclude that “countries with a program of direct privatisation through cash sales have 
attracted relatively higher inward investment than those countries using voucher 
privatisation” (p. 16). Clearly, the studies quoted here cover earlier time periods. 
The marginally insignificant coefficient on inflation points to the fact that inflation has
decreased considerably in the CEEC-8 compared to earlier periods of transition. Studies 
including earlier years and countries in macroeconomic turbulence (e.g. Edmiston et al. 
2003) reveal significant negative effects of inflation on FDI-flows. 
Finally, the analysis implies that political instability (risk) does not seem to be a relevant 
location factor within the CEEC-8. This is in marked contrast to studies using data from the 
beginning of the transformation process till the end of the 1990ies (e.g. Carstensen and 
Toubal 2004). Finally, the insignificance of tar is plausible as tariffs were brought down 
considerably during the 1990s and, hence, are of minor importance throughout our sample 
period. 
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[Table 4 here]
Relative importance of effective tax rates as a location factor 
Table 5 shows the Beta coefficients corresponding to model 2. Host-market size and distance 
are the most important determinants of net-FDI-outflows. This result is in line with many 
other studies (e.g. Mold 2003). Taxation, privatisation and unit labour costs are almost 
equally important as location factors. Inter alia these results imply that the role of taxes 
should not be overemphasized relative to that of other location determinants.
An alternative measure of the corporate income tax burden
In order to show that using statutory tax rates instead of the conceptually superior effective 
tax rates may lead to an underestimation of the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI we replace the 
beatr by the statutory tax rate (statrate) in model 2. Results for model 3 (reported in table 5) 
show the expected substantial drop of the semi-elasticity to about -1.9. This estimate also 
falls marginally short of statistical significance at the 10 percent significance level (two-
sided test). This should be considered as an indication that the relatively low value of the 
median semi-elasticity derived by anonymous (2006a) is partly due to the use of statutory tax 
rates. This result is also important with regard to evaluating the effectiveness of 
governments’ tax cuts, which might have had a larger effect on inward FDI than earlier 
studies have revealed. 
[Table 5 here]
Robustness and stability analysis
We check the robustness of our preferred specification in model 2 against the impact of 
possible cross-section outliers by dropping host countries stepwise (e.g. Winner 2005). 
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Thereby we focus on those variables which are relevant from a policy perspective (beatr, 
ulc, privrev). Table 6 reports the resulting minimum and maximum values of the coefficient 
estimates and the coefficient derived from model 2 as well as the country excluded. The 
results are robust with respect to dropping countries as no coefficient changes sign and all 
but one remain highly significant. The coefficient on ulc gets insignificant when Slovenia is 
excluded. This is plausible as Slovenia received low FDI and has comparably high unit 
labour costs when compared to other host countries in our sample.
[Table 6 here]
The stability of the coefficients on beatr, ulc and privrev is checked by combining these 
variables with a dummy variable for the years 2000-2003. The year 2000 has been chosen as 
some host countries (notably Romania and the Slovak Republic) started to reduce their beatr 
since 2000. Table 7 (models 4 to 6) shows that the semi-elasticities for beatr and ulc for the 
period 2000-2003 are not significantly different from that of previous years, but that the 
importance of privatisation as a driver of FDI is significantly lower from 2000 onwards. This 
last result seems to be plausible as the privatisation process leveled off in many CEECs 
around 2000 (EBRD transition report, various issues).
[Table 7 here]
6. Summary
The aim of this paper was to test the hypothesis that a high corporate tax burden acts as a 
deterrent to FDI-flows in the CEECs, since it exerts a negative effect on the profitability of 
investments. We suggest that using the statutory tax rate in previous studies might blur the 
effects of the tax burden on FDI and lead to questionable results. Therefore, we use the 
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bilateral effective average tax rates to explaining net-FDI-outflows from the 7 most 
important home countries to the CEEC-8. Referring to the eclectic paradigm as a conceptual 
basis, we find in a panel-gravity setting that FDI is positively related to both source country 
and host-market size as well as to progress in privatisation. Also, FDI is inversely related to 
the distance between home and host countries, to the corporate tax burden and to unit labour 
costs. We also find weak evidence for the negative impact of macroeconomic risk on FDI. 
Concerning the role of taxes three points are worth noting: 
First, the derived tax-elasticity is robust across various specifications and is greater in 
absolute value than those reported in earlier studies on the CEECs, pointing to a greater 
importance of tax policy for company location decisions than previously acknowledged. 
Second, the differences in the absolute value of the semi-elasticities when compared to 
earlier studies are clearly partly due to the use of beatrs. The derived semi-elasticity after 
replacing the beatr by statrate in our study is, indeed, substantially lower. 
Third, the relative importance of the corporate tax rate as a determinant of FDI must not be 
overemphasized as our results (Beta-coefficients) reveal that at least during the period 1995-
2003 the tax burden had no exceptional influence on net-FDI-outflows to the CEEC-8 when 
compared to other determinants.
While this study is a step towards a better understanding of the determinants of FDI-flows to 
the CEECs, there are several limitations to our analysis. In particular, we are conscious of 
the exclusion of location factors such as the quantity and quality of production related 
(public) infrastructure. This omission is due to the lack of meaningful data. Moreover, 
special investment incentives (e.g. regional, R&D) are not included, as many different 
incentives have been granted by CEEC governments throughout the sample period of nine 
years. The choice of incentives to be included in the beatr would be arbitrary. Moreover, 
many CEECs have reduced their special investment incentives to MNEs during our survey 
period in accordance with the aquis communautaire of the EU. For example, Boudier-
Bensebaa (2005) reported that, in Hungary, special tax incentives for MNEs have 
increasingly been phased out, or that domestic and foreign firms are now treated equally. 
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Finally, as data on the sectoral level become available differences in tax-rate elasticities 
between sectors should provide a more detailed picture on the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI.
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Table 1: Independent Variables
Source Variable Expected 
Sign
Market-related variables
(a) gdphomeit § Eurostat: New Cronos database Home country size 
measured as GDP home 
country in €m.
+
(b) gdphostjt § Eurostat: New Cronos database Host market size 
measured as GDP host 
country in €m.
+
Efficiency-related variables
(c) distij § http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm Distance in kilometres –
(i) combordij Maps Common border; 
Dummy variable: 1 if 
common border
+
(d) beatrijt Our own calculations based on Devereux and 
Griffith 1999; assumptions follow Devereux and 
Griffith except that we give investment in inventory 
less (10%) and investment in buildings more weight, 
as data for the CEECs show that investment in 
inventories is of minor importance; a pre-tax 
financial return of 20% is assumed; only corporate 
income taxes are considered; raw tax data are taken 
from the European Tax Handbook and KPMG’s 
Corporate Tax Rate Surveys
Bilateral effective 
average tax rate; 
measured in per cent
–
(e) ulcjt Own calculations based on van Ark and Monnikhof 
2000; data are taken from the AMECO database and 
the WIIW database
Real unit labour costs in 
common currency 
(Euro); measured in per 
cent
–
Transition-specific variables
(f) privrevjt Own calculations; EBRD: Transition Report Annual privatisation 
revenues in €m.
+
(g) riskjt Euromoney Political Risk; index 
ranging from 0 to 25
+
(h) ppjt EBRD: Transition Report Inflation measured as the 
percentage increase in 
producer prices.
–
(i) tarjt Own calculations; ratio of taxes and duties on 
imports excluding VAT over imports of goods and 
services; Eurostat: New Cronos database
Percentage tariffs on 
imports.
?
§ these variables are the “core” gravity variables
Page 49 of 58
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
20
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
lnfdi overall 4.02 1.75 -0.43 7.81 N = 449
between 1.39 1.66 7.19 n = 56
within 1.11 0.60 7.94 T = 8.02
lngdphome overall 13.90 1.10 12.11 16.24 N = 449
between 1.12 12.20 16.09 n = 56
within 0.14 13.43 14.24 T = 8.02
lngdphost overall 10.40 0.76 8.96 12.24 N = 449
between 0.75 9.38 11.94 n = 56
within 0.21 9.93 10.88 T = 8.02
lndist overall 6.99 0.98 4.03 9.15 N = 449
between 0.99 4.03 9.15 n = 56
within 0.00 6.99 6.99 T = 8.02
beatr overall 34.79 7.43 16.11 55.92 N = 449
between 5.37 24.07 48.07 n = 56
within 5.08 17.52 47.06 T = 8.02
ulc overall 25.42 9.23 11.00 50.00 N = 449
between 8.77 15.43 46.14 n = 56
within 2.89 15.42 33.22 T = 8.02
privrev overall 1223.80 1157.48 58.16 4570.03 N = 449
between 908.25 93.03 2712.47 n = 56
within 739.74 -19.38 4375.46 T = 8.02
pp overall 28.08 112.81 -1.20 901.80 N = 449
between 43.94 1.92 154.04 n = 56
within 104.10 -122.55 803.66 T = 8.02
risk overall 13.88 3.32 5.32 19.82 N = 449
between 2.90 9.59 17.48 n = 56
within 1.64 7.73 17.39 T = 8.02
tar overall 4.34 3.83 0.50 18.45 N = 449
between 3.07 0.95 11.71 n = 56
within 2.28 -0.17 13.43 T = 8.02
combord overall 0.31 0.33 0.00 1.00 N = 449
between 0.33 0.00 1.00 n = 56
within 0.00 0.13 0.13 T = 8.02
Table 3: Correlation Matrix
lngdphome lngdphost lndist combord beatr privrev pp risk ulc tar
lngdphome 1.00
lngdphost 0.03 1.00
lndist 0.75 -0.02 1.00
combord -0.29 0.10 -0.59 1.00
beatr 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 1.00
privrev 0.02 0.69 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 1.00
pp -0.02 -0.23 0.09 -0.07 0.14 -0.10 1.00
risk 0.03 0.52 -0.18 0.27 -0.21 0.39 -0.27 1.00
ulc 0.02 0.07 -0.10 0.18 -0.38 -0.10 -0.25 0.45 1.00
tar -0.05 -0.59 0.14 -0.18 0.09 -0.32 0.30 -0.67 -0.29 1.00
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Table 4: Estimation Results
Model 1 Model 2
lngdphome 0.25* 0.26*
(1.70) (1.76)
lngdphost 0.98*** 0.96***
(5.50) (6.21)
lndist -0.46** -0.46**
(-2.35) (-2.39)
combord 0.66“ 0.68*
(1.63) (1.72)
beatr -4.29*** -4.27***
(-3.42) (-3.41)
privrev 0.028*** 0.030***
(3.51) (3.93)
pp -0.084“ -0.090“
(-1.59) (-1.61)
ulc -3.40*** -3.30***
(-2.95) (-2.88)
risk 2.80
(0.91)
tar 2.20
(0.68)
cons -4.86** -4.29**
(-2.16) (-2.04)
N 449 449
R2 within
R2 between
R2 overall
0.33
0.66
0.52
0.33
0.67
0.52
AR(1): 21 0.97 1.21
Het.: 218:       
34.15** 
216:         
23.78* 
TD: 28 29.44*** 28.34***
Hausman: 28:            
11.48 
26:              
9.31 
BP:21 165.02*** 171.20***
Wald: 218:   
325.04***
216:   
316.15***
sigma_u 0.70 0.70
sigma_e 0.98 0.99
Reset: 23 3.54
stud.res > |3.5|: 0.00
Highest VIF: 5.40
Hausman-test for endogeneity of privrev
1st stage F-value on joint significance of instruments: 10.95
2nd stage p-value on statistical significance of 1st stage residuals 0.31
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  * p < 0.10; “ significant at 10 percent level in case of one-sided test; t-values in 
parenthesis; stud.res: studentized residuals; VIF: variance inflation factor; Het: LM-test for heteroskedasticity in 
fixed effects model; TD: time dummies; BP: Breusch-Pagan-test for random individual effects; Hausman: 
Hausman-test or Hausman-Wooldridge-test for fixed vs. random effects; AR(1): Wooldridge-test for serial 
correlation in linear panel data models; Reset: Ramsey-functional-form-test; Wald: model-test; groups = number 
of cross-sections; sigma_u = standard deviation of cross-section specific residual; sigma_e = standard deviation 
of remainder error term; theta = weight on cross-section specific mean in random effects model
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Table 5: Beta Coefficients and Statutory Tax Rate
Beta Coeff. Model 3
lngdphome                    0.16 0.19
(1.15)
lngdphost                      0.42 0.94***
(5.34)
lndist -0.26 -0.41*
(1.84)
beatr -0.18 statrate -1.90“
(-1.59)
privrev                          0.20 0.029***
(4.12)
ulc -0.17 -2.70**
(-2.30)
pp                                -0.05 -0.094*
(-1.84)
combord          0.66“
(1.41)
cons                                   -4.36*
(-1.83)
N                                    449 449
R2 within
R2 between
R2 overall
0.33
0.61
0.49
AR(1): 21 1.20
Het.: 216 22.87
TD: 28 36.32***
Hausman: 214 16.08
BP:21 257.13***
Wald: 216 267.83***
sigma_u 0.81
sigma_e 0.99
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  * p < 0.10; “ significant at 10 percent level in case of one-sided test; t-values in 
parenthesis; Het: LM-test for heteroskedasticity in fixed effects model; TD: time dummies; BP: Breusch-Pagan-
test for random individual effects; Hausman: Hausman-test or Hausman-Wooldridge-test for fixed vs. random 
effects; AR(1): Wooldridge-test for serial correlation in linear panel data models; Wald: model-test; groups = 
number of cross-sections; sigma_u = standard deviation of cross-section specific effects; sigma_e = standard 
deviation of remainder error term; theta = weight on cross-section specific mean in random effects model; 
standard deviations used to calculate Beta coefficients are taken from table 2; combord is a dichotomous variable; 
hence calculation of a Beta-coefficient is inadmissible
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Table 6: Jackknife Analysis
Minimum
(in absolute value)
Host country
excluded
Estimate Maximum
(in absolute value)
Host country 
excluded
beatr
ulc
privrev
-2.95** (-2.24)
-1.23 (-0.59)
0.023** (2.65)
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Hungary
-4.30***
-3.30***
0.03***
-5.91*** (-4.34)
-4.28*** (-3.36)
0.032*** (3.63)
Croatia
Romania
Poland
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; t-values in parenthesis
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Table 7: Stability Analysis
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
lngdphome 0.26* 0.27* 0.26*
(1.84) (1.83) (1.73)
lngdphost 0.97*** 0.93*** 0.96***
(6.34) (5.96) (6.05)
lndist -0.46** -0.49** -0.46**
(-2.45) (-2.49) (-2.31)
combord 0.68* 0.63“ 0.68*
(1.73) (1.55) (1.65)
pp -0.09* -0.07“ -0.09*
(-1.65) (-1.36) (-1.70)
beatr -4.50*** -3.80*** -4.40***
(-3.40) (-3.08) (-3.44)
dummy_beatr 0.22
(0.13)
privrev 0.03*** 0.044*** 0.03***
(4.24) (5.39) (4.37)
dummy_privrev -0.03***
(-3.12)
ulc -3.30*** -2.80** -3.40***
(-3.03) (-2.52) (-2.92)
dummy_ulc 0.46
(0.38)
cons -4.35** -4.03* -4.34**
(-2.10) (-1.90) (-2.01)
N 449 449 449
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; t-values in parenthesis; “ significant at 10 percent level in case of one-sided 
test
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